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1 Introduction 
In formal semantics it is the commonly held view that the ultimate goal of 
natural language semantics is to provide an account of the process of drawing 
inferences in natural language. As quantifiers play a very important role in this 
process, quantification is a topic of central interest in semantics. 
After a summary of Aristotle's and Frege's theories of quantification, the re-
lational perspective on quantifiers that forms the basis of most current accounts 
of quantifiers in natural language is sketched. General conditions on quantifier 
relations are given, and several kinds of representations for quantifiers are dis-
cussed. Next , the linguistic interest of relational properties such as symmetry 
and various forms of monotonicity is illustrated, and the connections between 
quantifier theory and automata theory are sketched. Finally, presuppositional 
quantifiers, partial quantifiers, adverbial quantifiers and the phenomenon of 
quantifier branching are briefly discussed. 
2 Aristotle on Quantification 
The first systematic account of quantification was given by Aristotle in his theory 
of the syllogism. Aristotle studied the following inferential pattern: 
Quantifier1 Nbar1 VP1 
Quantifier2 Nbar2 VPz 
Quantifier3 Nbar3 VP3 
Example (the valid syllogism BARBARA): 
All A are B 
All Bare C 
All A are C 
Syllogistic theory focusses on the quantifiers in the so called Square of Oppo-
sition: see figure ( l ). The quantifiers in the square express relations between 
a first and a second argument , where both arguments denote sets of entities 
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Figure 1: The Square of Opposition 
All A are B No A are B 
Some A are B Not all A are B 
taken from some domain of discourse, a set of entities which is assumed in the 
background as the subject matter of the discourse. 
The quantified expressions in the square are related across the diagonals by 
external (sentential) negation, and across the horizontal edges by internal (or 
verb phrase) negation. It follows that the relation across the vertical edges of the 
square is that of internal plus external negation; this is the relation of so-called 
quantifier duality. Because Aristotle assumes that the domain of discourse is 
non-empty, the two quantified expressions on the top edge of the square cannot 
both be false; these expressions are called contraries. For the same reason, the 
two quantified expressions on the bottom edge cannot both be false: they are 
so-called subcontraries. Next, Aristotle interprets his quantifiers with existential 
import: All A are B is taken to imply that there are A, and similarly for the 
other quantifiers. Under this assumption, the quantified expressions at the top 
edge of the square imply those immediately below them. 
For those who care for some more terminology: the universal affirmative 
quantifier all implies the individual affirmative some and the universal nega-
tive no implies the individual negative not all. The universal and individual 
a ffirmative quantifiers are said to be of types A and I respectively, from Latin 
A/Jlrmo, the universal and individual negative quantifiers of type E and 0 , 
from Latin N EgO. The Medieval mnemonics for the Aristotelean syllogisms 
derive from these abbreviations: Barbara is the name of the syllogism with two 
universal affirmative premisses and a universal affirmative conclusion, and so 
on. 
Impressive though it is, Aristotle's theory of quantification has two grave 
logical defects: 
l. Quantifier combinations are not treated; only one quantifier per sentence 
is allowed. 
2. ·Non-standard quantifiers' such as most, half of, at least five, . .. are not 
covered. 
A minor additional flaw is the assumption of existential presupposition. In 
mathematical reasoning, and sometimes also in everyday reasoning, one wants 
to be able to assert universally quantified statements without the bother of first 
having to provide existence proofs. 
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3 Frege's Standard Quantifiers 
Gottlob Frege's theory of quantification is basically what we now call first order 
predicate logic (see the articles on FREGE and FIRST ORDER LOGIC). It 
is based on the introduction of individual variables bound by the quantifiers V 
('for all') and 3 ('there exists'), and it removes the first of the two defects of 
the Aristotelian theory. Quantifiers with their associated variables can combine 
with arbitrarily complex predicate logical formulas to form new predicate logical 
formulas, so a formula may contain an arbitrary number of quantifiers. 
The quantifiers V and 3 are called the standard quantifiers. These two quan-
tifiers are interdefinable with the help of negation: Something stinks means the 
same as It is not the case that it holds for every x that x does not stink, and 
Everything is fine means the same as It is not the case that there is a thing x 
with the property that x is not fine. More formally: 3xAx is true if and only if 
-Vx - Ax is true, and VxAx is true if and only if -3x - Ax is true. 
If one conveniently forgets about the existential presuppositions, the Aris-
totelian quantifiers from the Square of Opposition can be expressed in terms of 
the Fregean standard quantifiers, as follows (with"" for 'translates as') : 
All A are B ""Vx(Ax-+ Bx). 
Some A is/are B"" 3x(Ax I\ Bx). 
No A is B '°'"" Vx(Ax-. -Bx). 
Not all A are B"" -Vx(Ax-+ Bx). 
Note that Vx(Ax I\ Bx) means something stronger than All A are B, for this for-
mula can be paraphrased as: Everything is both A and B. Also, 3x( Ax -+ Bx) 
means something much weaker than Some A are B, for it can be paraphrased 
as: Something is B if it is A, and this is already true provided there is at least 
one thing in the domain of discourse which lacks property A. Another thing to 
note is that different ways of rendering an Aristotelian quantifier in Frege's logic 
may be equivalent. Another possible translation for No A is Bis -3x(Ax/\Bx). 
There is nothing to choose between the two translations because in every situ-
ation where t.he first one is true the second one is true as well, and vice versa. 
Using standard quantifiers and the identity sign it is also possible to express 
numerical constraints like At least 2 A are B: 
3x3y(x f- y I\ Ax I\ Ay I\ Bx/\ By). 
It is not difficult to see that all disjunctions and conjunctions of quantifiers of 
the forms 'at least n' and 'at most m' can be expressed in terms of standard 
quantifiers and the identity sign. 
To illustrate the claim that first order logic has no difficulty with quantifier 
combinations, consider the translation of example ( l ). 
(1) Et•ery prince sang a ballad. 
Vx(Px-. 3y(By /\ Sxy)). 
Observe that the translation does not contain phrases corresponding to the noun 
phrases every prince or a ballad. Given a natural language sentence and its 
translation into first order logic, it is impossible to pinpoint the subexpression 
in the translation that gives the meaning of a particular noun phrase in the 
original. In the translation into first order logic, the noun phrases have been 
syntactically eliminated , so to speak. 
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The next example, (2), with the two possible translations listed below it, 
can serve to illustrate a few further points. 
(2) One ballad was sung by every prince. 
3y(By I\ \/x(Px-. Sxy)). 
\/x(Px-+ 3y(By I\ Sxy)). 
The fact that both translations are appropriate for (2) shows that the sentence 
is ambiguous. It also shows that translating into first order logic can be used 
to disambiguate natural language sentences. In such cases one says that the 
different translations express different readings of the original sentence. 
Note that no systematic procedure for arriving at the translations was given. 
In fact, logic textbooks teach the art of translating from natural language into 
first order logic by listing examples, until the reader has got the knack of it. The 
translations presuppose that the reader does already have a full grasp of what 
the sentences under consideration mean. It follows that an ad hoc process of 
translating from natural language to a logical representation language like first 
order logic cannot count as an explication of what natural language expressions 
mean. 
In the antediluvian era of natural language semantics, the time when first 
order predicate logic was still considered as the one and only tool for semantic 
analysis , quantified noun phrases were commonly regarded as systematically 
misleading expressions. Their natural language syntax did not correspond to 
their logic, for in natural language they were separate constituents, but they 
evaporated during the process of translation into first order logic. 
The Fregean view on quantifiers is a vast improvement over the Aristotelean 
view. Three areas with scope for further improvement remain: (i) finding logical 
representation languages permitting the preservation of noun phrases as sepa-
rate constituents, (ii) finding procedures for translating from natural language 
to logical representations that are not ad hoc, and (iii) finding ways to treat 
non standard quantifiers such as most, preferably in a uniform framework with 
standard quantifiers. 
4 The Relational Perspective 
In the relational perspective on quantifiers, first proposed in (Mostowski 1957). 
a quantifier is viewed as a two-place relation on the power set of a domain of 
discourse E satisfying certain requirements. The power set of a set E, notation 
P(E), is the set of all subsets of E. A two-place relation on P(E) is a set of 
pairs of subsets of E. The relational perspective on quantification is implicit in 
Montague grammar (see the article MONTAGUE) . It was first systematically 
applied to natural language analysis in Barwise & Cooper (1981). Below it will 
be shown that the relational view can be used to remedy the defects of both 
the Aristotelian and the Fregean theory. It covers non standard quantifiers, it 
allows quantifier combinations of arbitrary complexity, it does not syntactically 
eliminate quantified noun phrases, and it can be used as one of the ingredients 
in a non ad hoc translation procedure from natural language to a language of 
logical representations. 
We will start by demonstrating that in the modern relational perspective 
the suggestion of misleading form disappears. Two simple example sentences 
will illustrate that a representation language with generalized quantifier expres-
sions ( expressions denoting two place relations between sets) and a notation 
for lambda abstraction (see the article LAMBDA OPERATOR) is eminently 
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suited for the compositional analysis of natural language sentences with quan-
tified noun phrases. First consider example (3). 
(3) Every woman smiled. 
This sentence is composed of a noun phrase every woman, composed in turn 
of a determiner every and a noun woman, and a verb phrase smiled. The de-
terminer every translates into an expression every denoting a function from 
properties to a function from properties to truth values. More precisely, ev-
ery denotes the function mapping property P to (the characteristic function 
of) the set of all properties having P as a subset. The noun woman trans-
lates into ,\x.W.r., the verb phrase smiled into >.y.Sy, the noun phrase euery 
woman into every( ,\x. W x ), and, finally, the whole sentence into the expres-
sion (every(,\x.Wx))(,\y.Sy). The reader is urged to check that this expression 
yields true in case the property of being a woman is included in the property of 
smiling, false otherwise. 
To see how quantifier combinations are dealt with compositionally, consider 
example (4). 
(4) Every mermaid hummed a song. 
The trick is finding the right translation for the transitive verb. This turns out 
to be the lambda expression ,\X>.y.X(,\z.Hyz), where Xis a variable over noun 
phrase type expressions. The verb translation is of the right type to take the 
object noun phrase translation as its argument; this gives translation (5) for the 
verb phrase, which reduces to (6). 
( 5) J\X>.y.X( ,\z. H yz )(a( ,\ u.Su) ). 
(6) ,\y.(a( ,\u.Su))(J\ z .Hyz). 
Here a denotes the function which maps every property P to (the characteristic 
function of) the set of all properties having a non-empty overlap with P. Feeding 
(6) as argument to the expression every(>.x .. Mx), the translation of the subject, 
one gets (7) as translation for the whole sentence. 
(7) ( every(,\x . .M ;r) )( ,\y.(a(,\u.Su))(,\z.H yz) ). 
This translation can still be simplified somewhat, by writing Al and S for the 
property denoting expressions ,\x.l'.f ;r and ,\u.Su. 
( 8) ( every( Al))( ,\y.( a( S) )( ,\z.H yz) ). 
The compositional semantic analysis of natural language sentences involving 
quantifiers is the reverse of the process of compositional synthesis demonstrated 
here. 
In the remainder of this article, quantifiers will be studied from a relational 
point of view. For purposes of presentation, attention will be largely limited 
to noun phrase quantifiers (but see the section on adverbial quantifiers below). 
Moreover, only discrete quantifiers will be treated, and extending the account to 
continuous quantifiers, as in Some milk was spilt or Two hundred kilogrammes 
of hashish were discorered will be left to the reader: these cases involve issues 
in the semantics of measurement that are irrelevant to our main issue (see the 
article MEASUREMENT PHRASES). Finally, intensional phenomena, as in All 
Jake millionnaires are cunning and Some alleged geniuses a·re conceited will be 
ignored. 
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5 Conditions on Quantifier Relations 
All men walk is true in a given model if and only if the relation of inclusion 
holds between the set of men in the model and the set of walkers in the model. 
Abstracting from the domain of discourse, we can say that determiner interpre-
tations (henceforth: determiners) pick out binary relations on sets of individuals, 
on arbitrary universes (or: domains of discourse) E. Notation: DEAB. We call 
A the restriction of the quantifier and B its body. If DEE AB is the translation 
of a simple sentence consisting of a quantified noun phrase with an intransitive 
verb phrase then the noun denotation is the restriction and the verb phrase 
denotation the body. See figure (2) for a graphical representation. 
Figure 2: Quantifiers as Relations 
.-----------. E 
A B 
GD 
Not all two-place relations on sets of individuals are quantifier-relations. The 
firs t two requirements that quantifiers must meet are general requirements for 
denotations of determiners: extension and conservati-i•ity, which will be abbre-
viated as EXT and CONS , respectively. See the article DETERMINERS for 
fu rther information. The combined effect of EXT and CONS boils down to 
limiting the domain of discourse relevant for the truth or falsity of DEAB to 
two sets: the set of things which are A but not B (formally: t he set .4 - B), 
and the set of things which are both A and B (formally: the set An B) . 
Next , the relational perspective suggests a very natural way of distinguishing 
between expressions of quantity and other relations. Quantifier relations satisfy 
the following condition of isomorphy, formulated in terms of bijections (see the 
a rtide BIJECTION) . 
ISOM If f is a bijection from E to E' , then DEAB ⇒ DE' f [A]f [B ]. 
Here J [A], the image of A under J, is the set of all things which are !-values of 
t hings in A. ISOM expresses that only the cardinalities (numbers of elements) 
of the sets A and B matter , for the image of a set under a bijection is a set with 
the same number of elements as the original set. If D satisfies EXT, CONS 
a nd ISOM , it turns out that the truth of DAB depends only on the cardinal 
numbers IA-Bl and IAnBI (respectively, the number of things which are A but 
not B , and the number of things which are both .4 and B) . See figure (3) for 
the combined effect of these three conditions. A quantifier simply is a relation 
Q satisfying EXT, CONS and ISOM. 
Some examples will make clearer how the semantic effect of a quantifier Q AB 
can always be described in terms of the properties of the numbers IA - Bl and 
IA n Bl. All A are B is true if and only if the number of things which are A 
and not B is 0. Some A is B is true if and only if the number of things that 
are both A and Bis at least l. 1'1Jost A are B is true if and only if the number 
of things that are both A and B exceeds the number of things that are A and 
not B. 
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Figure 3: The Combined Effect of EXT, CONS, ISOM 
..---------~E 
A B A B 
GD GD 
6 Numerical Trees 
Suppose a quantifier Q has A as a first and B as a second argument. Q can then 
be characterized as a subset of the tree of numbers given in figure ( 4). The first 
number in each number pair is IA - Bl, the second one 1-4 n Bl. Some examples 
of tree patterns for quantifiers are given in figure (5) . 
Figure 4: General Format of a Numerical Tree 
IAI = o 0,0 
IAI = 1 1,0 0, 1 
IAI = 2 2,0 1, 1 0,2 
IAI = 3 3,0 2,1 1,2 0,3 
IAI = 4 4,0 3,1 2,2 1,3 0,4 
IAI = 5 5,0 4, 1 3,2 2,3 1, 4 0,5 
To get used to these representations, one should try and answer some ques-
tions about numerical trees, such as the following. What are the tree patterns 
for all, some, no and not all? How are these patterns related? What are the tree 
patterns for at most three and exactly three? How are the patterns for a.t most 
three, at least three and exactly three related? Which tree operations correspond 
to taking the negation of a quantifier, the conjunction of two quantifiers, the 
disjunction of two quantifiers? 
7 Logical Representations for Quantifiers 
The pairs of cardinals that characterize a quantifier QA.B can be used for rep-
resentation purposes. Every quantifier is defined by means of an arithmetical 
expression in two variables m and n, where m is the number of elements in .4- B, 
n the number of elements in .4n B. Logical forms for quantified expressions can 
exploit this fact: 
• at least two "- n 2 2. 
•all "-'+ m = 0. 
• no "-'+ n = 0. 
Logical operations on quantifier-determiners can now be handled composition-
ally, by performing the corresponding logical operations on the arithmetical 
expressions: 
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Figure 5: Examples of Numerical Trees 
at least three A are B 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
less than half of the A are B 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
An e 11en number of the A are B 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + + 
+ + + 
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• if Q--... Ethen (not Q]--... -E. 
• if Q1 --... E 1 and Q2 --... E2 then 
[Q1 and Q2]--... E1 /\ E2 and [Q1 or Q2]--... E1 V E2 
For instance, according to these instructions, the arithmetical expression that 
translates at least two but not all is: n 2: 2 /\ -m = 0. 
8 Relational Properties 
As quantifiers are relations, we can study their relational properties and the 
way in which these properties are reflected in the tree patterns. For example, a 
quantifier Q is reflexive if and only if: 
VXQXX. 
The quantifiers all and some are reflexive, the quantifiers no and not all are not. 
One can now study questions about tree patterns such as the following. If Q is 
reflexive, what will its tree pattern be like? Can it be shown that every quantifier 
with this tree pattern is reflexive? If some quantifier Q has a tree pattern with 
an outer north east diagonal consisting of --signs, which relational property of 
Q does this reflect? 
A relational property with linguistic interest is symmetry. A quantifier Q is 
symmetric if and only if: 
VXVYQXY ¢=::::} QY X . 
It is left to the reader to establish the corresponding tree pattern. The linguistic 
interest of this class lies in the fact that the symmetric quantifiers are precisely 
the class of quantifiers which can occur at the Q position in ' there'-existential 
sentences (sentences of the form There are Q). 
9 Monotonicity 
Another example of a relational property of quantifiers with linguistic interest 
( to be illustrated below) is upward right-monotonicity in the second argument 
place: 
MON T If QAB and B ~ B', then QAB'. 
Examples: all, some, at least five. The tree pattern corresponding to MONf 
turns out to be the following: 
• If a node has a + , then all nodes to the right on the same row have +-s. 
A quantifier relation is downward right monotone in the second argument if the 
following holds: 
MON 1 If QAB and B' ~ B then QAB'. 
Examples: not all, no. Corresponding tree pattern property: 
• If a node has a +, then all nodes to the left on the same row have +-s. 
Inspection of the tree pattern makes clear that an e11en number of is neither 
MON T nor MON! . 
Barwise and Cooper ( 1981) observed a certain correlation between the mono-
tonicity properties of conjoined noun phrases on the one hand and the use of and 
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versus but on the other: noun phrases that are monotone in the same direction 
are conjoined with and, monotonicity in opposite directions triggers conjunction 
by means of but. Examples: all men and some women, many English but no 
Dutch. Of course, other factors are at work as well . 
A second linguistic application is the account of so-called negative and pos-
itive polarity phenomena in natural language. 
(9) Few people lifted a finger to help the wounded soldiers . 
(10) *Jl,fany people lifted a finger to help the wounded soldiers. 
( 11) No sailor refused any of the gifts . 
(12} *Every sailor refused any of the gifts. 
To lift a finger and any are negative polarity items: they must be in a 'negative 
context' . The noun phrases allowing negative polarity items in their scopes turn 
out to be, roughly at least , the MON! noun phrases. 
Negative polarity items have positive counterparts: expressions allowed within 
the scope ofa MONT noun phrase but awkward in the scope ofa MON! noun 
phrase: 
( 13) Some people could hardly believe it. 
(14} *Nobody could hardly believe it. 
A further linguistic question suggested here is the following. Given some list 
of positive polarity items in English, is it possible to arrive at more finegrained 
classifications by subdividing this list into items that are allowed within the 
scope of a noun phrase which is neither MON T nor MON! and items that are 
not allowed in such contexts? 
Some questions that can be solved by looking at the tree pattern charac-
terisations of the monotonicity properties are the following. What is the effect 
of negation on monotonicity? What monotonicity property does the conjunc-
tion of two MON T (MON 1) noun phrases have? What is the monotonicity 
behaviour of the disjunction of two MONT (MON!) noun phrases? What is 
the monotonicity property of the conjunction (disjunction) of a MONT and a 
MON ! noun phrase? The answers to these questions can be 'tested empirically' 
by substituting the resulting noun phrases in sentences containing negative or 
positive polarity items. 
One can also study monotonicity in the first argument : 
TMON If QAB and A~ A' then Q.4' B. 
! MON If QA.Band A'~ A then QA' B. 
Examples of TMON determiners are some and not all. All and no are l MON 
determiners . It is left to the reader to establish the tree patterns corresponding 
to the TMON and !MON properties. 
( 15) All sailors who 1·efused any of the gifts were despised . 
( 16) *Some sailors who refused any of the gifts were despised. 
Examples (15) and (16) illustrate that monotonicity properties in the left argu-
ment can be used to explain polarity phenomena within the syntactic restriction 
of the determiners, i.e . within the noun phrases that have these determiners as 
their heads. 
10 Quantifiers and Automata 
Quantifiers correspond to automata that accept strings over a binary alphabet 
{O, I}: a string s with m zeros and n ones in it is accepted if and only if 
position (m, n) in the numerical tree for the quantifier has a +. To give an 
example, the quantifier all corresponds to the regular language I* ( the set of 
all strings consisting of just 1-s). Figure (6) give a finite state machine (see the 
article FINITE STATE MACHINES) for this quantifier. 
Figure 6: Finite State Machine for Computing 'All' 
1 0 ,1 
0 tJ 
=?@--------• 0 
The reader is encouraged to construct finite state machines for computing 
at least two, at most five and between three and seuen. Would these finite state 
machines still work if one would wish to allow strings of infinite length? 
The languages accepted by quantifier automata are closed under permuta-
tion: it is the number of zeros and ones in the string that counts, not the order 
in which they are presented. Call a finite state machine permutation invariant 
if it has the following property: if reading a string s will get the machine from 
state p to state q, then reading any permutation of s will also get the machine 
from state p to state q. Quantifier automata must be permutation invariant. A 
finite state machine is acyclic if the machine does never return to a given state 
once it has left that state (in other words: I-cycles are allowed, but all other 
cycles are out). An example of a quantifier that can be computed by a cyclic 
finite state machine but not by an acyclic one is an e11en number of 
A quantifier is called first order definable if it is definable in terms of the 
Fregeau quantifiers V and 3, the identity predicate, and the two predicates for the 
restriction and the body of the quantifier. The question of first order definability 
is relevant for the semantics of natural language, because the suitability oflogical 
representation languages for given natural language fragments depends on it. 
The first order definable quantifiers are exactly those that can be computed by 
an acyclic permutation-invariant finite state machine (Van Benthem 1986). It 
follows from this that an euen number of is not first order definable (a cyclic 
automaton is needed for its computation), nor are quantifiers like half and most, 
which cannot be computed on a finite state machine at all (a memory stack is 
needed to ' remember' the numbers of elements in A - B and An B). The reader 
is encouraged to design a push down stack automaton for computing most. 
The automata-perspective can be exploited to give an account of semi-
quantifiers involving ordinals: 
(17) Every tenth passenger will recei11e a free bottle of champagne 
on board. 
( 18) The first ten passengers will receive a free bottle of champagne 
on board. 
It 1s not difficult to design finite state machines for computing these semi-
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quantifiers. Note that semi-quantifiers do not observe ISOM. The reader 1s 
encouraged to formulate a weaker condition that they do satisfy. 
11 Quantifiers and Presupposition 
It is sometimes profitable to distinguish between the content and the presup-
position of a quantified phrase. The difference between four men walked and 
the four men walked can be expressed in terms of this distinction as follows. 
The first sentence is true if a set of four entities can .be found that were walking 
men, false otherwise. The second is true if the domain of discourse contains 
exactly four entities which are men, and all those entities were walkers, false if 
the domain contains exactly four men and not all those entities were walkers, 
and undefined in case the domain does not contain exactly four men. Thus we 
see that quantifiers loaded with a presupposition introduce truth value gaps, 
or a 'third truth value': in case the presupposition does not hold the quan-
tified expression is neither true nor false, but 'something else' (see the article 
PRESUPPOSITION). 
Aristotle held that in the Square of Opposition the quantified expressions 
on the top row each imply the expressions immediately below them: all men 
walked should imply some men walked, and similarly for no gallants sang and 
not all gallants sang. This reflects the fact that the Aristotelian quantifiers are 
supposed to have existential import: QAB implies that there are As. The exis-
tential import of natural language quantifiers can be viewed as a presupposition 
associated with the use of those quantifiers. The quantifier Q AB is true if there 
are A and A, B are in the Q relation; it is false if there are A and A, B are 
not in the Q relation, and it is undefined ( or has a third value) if there are no 
A. Again, there is a value which is neither true nor false for cases where the 
presupposition is not fulfilled. 
12 Quantifiers and Partiality 
Studying quantifiers in a partial setting is necessary, among other things, to be 
able to deal with the semantics of perception reports. 
(19) I saw two bears prepare sandwiches. 
(20) Two bears were preparing sandwiches. 
(21) I saw no bears p·repare sandwiches. 
(22) No beal's were preparing sandwiches. 
(23) I saw nobody on the road. 
(24) Nobody was on the road. 
From the truth of sentence (19) it follows that two bears were indeed preparing 
sandwiches, so (20) is a consequence of (19), but from the truth of (21) it does 
not follow that no bears were preparing sandwiches, so (22) is not a consequence 
of (21). The same holds for the relation between (23) and (24). 
Obviously, some semantic difference between the quantifiers tu:o bears and 
no bears ( or nobody) must account for this difference in logical behaviour. One 
might think that the difference between ( 19) and (21) is simply a matter of scope: 
in the second sentence, but not in the first, the quantifier in the complement has 
scope over the sentence. The explanation will not do, however, as the infinitival 
subject position is not a scope sensitive position, witness the fact that neither 
(19) nor (21) exhibits a scope ambiguity. Rather, the fact that the quantifier in 
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(19) seems to have narrow scope and that the quantifier in (21) seems to have 
wide scope, while neither of the two sentences exhibits a scope ambiguity does 
itself call for a semantic explanation. 
The starting point of the semantic investigation of perception reports is the 
the following question: which quantifier property licences the inference in (25)? 
(25) / saw QAB./ Therefore: QAB. 
A key feature of the semantics of perception reports is the fact that perception 
sentences like (26) do not imply variants where the perception complement is 
replaced by an equivalent complement ( equivalent in classical logic, that is), as 
in (27). 
(26) I saw John help Mary. 
(27) I saw John help Mary and help Bill or not help Bill. 
In a classical framework the complements in (26) and (27) are logically equiva-
lent, so the semantic distinction between the two examples gets lost. To preserve 
it one must distinguish between (partial) models supported by what I saw, (par-
tial) models refuted by what I saw, and (partial) models untouched by what I 
saw. This threefold distinction using partial models ( or situations) accounts for 
the difference between (26) and (27), for it may be that a situation where John 
helps Mary is supported by what I saw, while on the other hand none of the 
situations supported by what I saw have Bill in it. 
The switch to a partial perspective involves for every predicate P a dis-
tinction between things satisfying P, things not satisfying P, and things doing 
neither. Restricting attention to the case of two predicates A and B on a uni-
verse E, partial predicate A on E divides E in a region of things that do satify 
A ( call this set A+), a region of things that do not satisfy A ( call this set A - ) 
and a region of things with unknown A status (call this set A•). Similarly, the 
partial version of B carves up E in three regions B+, B- and B•. Extending 
quantifier theory to cover this three valued rase involves providing suitable ex-
tensions of the principles EXT, CONS and ISOM. Rather that spelling out 
these details, we sketch the application to perception reports. 
Any proper handling of perception reports will have to involves something 
like the following principle of Scenic Inclusion: 
SCENIC INCL If Risa relation between perceivers and situations they per-
ceive, and s is a situation in which pRs' holds (with pa perceiver, R a 
relation of perception, and s' a scene perceived by pin s), then s' ~ s, 
i.e. e\·erything which is true in s' is also true in s, and everything which 
is false in s is also false in s'. 
The principle says, in fact, that perception implies truth. It does account for 
the scope transparency of perception reports that was noted above. To see that 
errors in perception are irrelevant to the principle, note that a perception error 
is merely a case where the scene one believes to perceive is different from the 
scene one actually perceives. Cases of ironic reports such as John saw ghosts on 
the cemetery again will be ignore here, as pragmatic factors are involved in the 
fact that such reports do not imply truth. 
By virtue of SCENIC INCL, the quantifiers licensing the inference in (25) 
are precisely the quantifiers which are persistent under situation inclusion: the 
quantifiers Q with the property that if Q.4.B holds in a situation s and s ~ s' 
then Q AB holds in s' (because of the partial perspective one must add the dual 
relation for falsity, for good measure: if Q AB is false in a situation s' and s ~ s' 
then Q A.B is false in s ). Under some suitable assumptions the ~ persistent 
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quantifiers turn out to be precisely the TMON quantifiers. This explains the 
logical implication relations between (19), (20), (21) and (22). 
13 Implicit and Adverbial Quantification 
For reasons of presentation, attention above was limited to noun phrase quantifi-
cation. This limitation should not detract from the obvious fact that quantifiers 
show up explicitly or implicitly in a plethora of other natural language settings. 
Quantification is implicit in the semantics of tense ( the present perfect tense in 
John has lived in Cambridge involves an implicit existential quantification over 
periods of time), in the semantics of modality (the semantics of John knows how 
to swim involves an implicit existential quantification over situations which are 
in accordance with John's abilities and in which John swims), and in lexical 
semantics in general ( the semantics of John is an ex-convict involves an implicit 
existential quantification over a period of time in the past which John spent in 
jail after a conviction). 
Explicit quantification can also be found outside noun phrases, in particular 
in adverbial modifiers. English has explicit adverbs of quantification for quan-
tifying over locations ( everywhere, somewhere, nowhere), over periods of time 
( always, sometimes, never, often), and over states of affairs ( necessa1·ily, possi-
bly). Just like all A, some A, no A and not all A, the quartet always, sometimes, 
ne11er and not always forms an Aristotelian square. In the same manner as with 
noun phrase quantifiers, these standard adverbial quantifiers have non standard 
cousins: often, seldom, at least five times, more than once, exactly twice, and so 
on. 
Adverbial quantifiers behave very much like noun phrase quantifiers, the 
main difference being their different domain of quantification. An exact specifi-
cation of the domain of quantification can be difficult. Contextual information 
may be needed to to determine whether an adverbial quantifier ranges over pe-
riods of time, events, or occasions, and to determine the 'granularity' of the 
domain of quantification: 'Are the periods of time measured in seconds, days, 
years, aeons?', etcetera. 
(28) Dinner is always served at six p.m. here. 
(29) Everyone is expected to pay attention to the teacher. 
The fact that the temporal adverb in (28) ranges over days has to be inferred 
from the overall meaning of the sentence. But note that a similar overall con-
straint on the domain of quantification is present in (29) with respect to the 
quantified noun phrase: the overall meaning of the sentence has to be taken 
into account to establish that the quantifier ranges over everyone present in the 
situation except the teacher. 
14 Quantifier Branching 
Examples like the following have been accorded special status in the literature 
on natural language quantification. 
(30) Most men and most women like each other. 
(31) Few men and Jew women like each other. 
(32) Exactly four men and exactly three women like each other. 
The most plausible reading for example (30) is the one which is true just in 
case there are sets iv! and W with 1\,/ consisting of a majority of the men and 
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W of a majority of the women, and the members of M and W like each other. 
Similarly, (31 ), in its most plausible reading, is true if and only if all possible 
sets !VI of men and W of women, with the members of i\,f and W liking each 
other, are such that J'.tl contains only a small number of the men and W only 
a small number of the women (the sizes of t hese norm numbers depending on 
context). Finally, (32) is true if and only if the sets M of men and W of women 
such that M and W like each other (i.e., presumably, all members of Al like all 
members of vV, and vice versa ) have 4 and 3 elements , respectively. 
The common element in t hese analyses is that they involve sets picked in-
dependently of each other. T his mutual independence suggests that for these 
examples neither putting the second noun phrase within the scope of the first 
one nor proceeding the other way around will produce the right result . What 
is needed, instead, is a so-called branching reading, where denotations for the 
quantifiers in the different branches are established indepently. Branching read-
ings of quantifier pairs, or more generally quantifier n tuples, make sense only in 
cases where the quantifiers have similar monotonicity behaviour in the second 
argument: both MONT, as in (30), both MON!, as in (31), or both numerical 
(the numerical quantifier are conjunctions of MONT and MONl quantifiers). 
References 
[l] Barwise J 1981 'Scenes and Other Situations ' , The Journal of Philosophy, 
78, 369-397. 
[2] Barwise J & R Cooper 1981 'Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Lan-
guage ', Linguistics and Philosophy, 4, 159-219. 
(3] Montague R 1973 'The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary 
English', in Hintikka e.a. (eds.) , Approaches to Natural Language, Reidel, 
Dordrecht, 221-242. 
[4] Mostowski A 1957 'On a Generalization of Quantifiers' , Fundamenta Math-
ematica, 44, 12-36. 
[5] Van Benthem J 1986 Essays in Logical Semantics, Reidel, Dordrecht. 
[6] Westerstahl D 1989 'Quantifiers in Formal and Natural Languages', in 
Gabbay & Guenthner {eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. IV, 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1-131. 
15 



